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Introduction
Since the late 1980s rural areas in the Southeast have increased manufacturing employ-
ment in absolute numbers while urban areas have shed this employment.  As a result, the relative
manufacturing dependence of rural areas has increased, and many of these areas are specialized
in one manufacturing industry.  However, there is considerable uncertainty as to the dangers or
benefits of specialization.  The trend toward industrial diversification––deriving support as a
policy goal from the analogy of an investment portfolio in which the collection of industry is
thought to determine the stability of a local economy (Brown and Pheasant 1987; Smith and Gib-
son 1988)––may be slowed or reversed suggesting strong vulnerabilities to economic shocks.
Or, if the concentration of manufacturing in rural areas is in declining industries then the long–
term prospects for economic growth are seemingly bleak.  Countering these claims, recent work
on endogenous growth (Romer 1986), interregional trade (Gilchrist and St. Louis 1991) and
industrial clusters (Henry and Drabenstott 1996) suggest potential benefits from increased
specialization.
This paper examines the validity of three alternative rationales for industrial specializa-
tion.  Manufacturing specialization in rural areas can be explained by 1) the exploitation of scale
economies by very large plants; 2) the “localization” advantages identified with a number of
firms in the same industry locating near each other; or 3) a strategy to gain bargaining power in
isolated rural labor markets by a dominant employer in the county.  To test these rationales clus-
ter analysis is used to identify counties that are specialized in an industry at the two-digit SIC
level.  The results are then used in an econometric exercise to identify the characteristics associ-
ated with manufacturing specialization.  Increased understanding of the possible reasons for in-
dustrial specialization will help frame policy responses to the potential economic opportunities
and economic crises facing rural areas.2
Operationalizing Rationales for Industrial Specialization
Internal Economies of Scale
The literature generally supports the conjecture that minimum efficient scale of produc-
tion may explain industrial specialization in the rural case.  Support comes from disparate
sources ranging from the ‘new economic geography,’ the more mature product cycle theory, and
empirical investigations in industrial organization.  According to Krugman (1991), it is the inter-
action of scale economies in production and marketing with transportation economies and geo-
graphic concentration of raw materials that determines tendencies toward specialization in a
fewer number of sites or dispersal across the economic landscape.  The theoretical framework of
the new economic geography posits that a decrease in transportation costs and an increase in in-
ternal scale economies will result in production concentrating in fewer locations.  While the de-
cline in transportation costs in modern times is seemingly incontrovertible (Kilkenny 1998) the
direction of internal scale economies is more contentious.  The trends in the magnitude, and ar-
guably the direction, of scale economies have varied across manufacturing industries over time
(Milgrom and Roberts 1990).  This provides a source of empirical leverage later in the analysis
when we compare the relative importance of minimum efficient scale of production explaining
specialization across industries.
The strong association of the product life-cycle hypothesis of industrial development with
rural industrialization strongly supports the minimum efficient scale of production rationale.
Within this framework emergent industries will be characterized by a large number of small, di-
verse market niches.  More mature industries will be characterized by larger markets of more
standardized products with standardized production processes as well.  Firms are thus more apt
to make large investments in purpose built machinery to replace the higher variable cost combi-
nation of general-purpose machinery and more highly skilled workers.  Since cost becomes an3
increasingly important mediator of exchange, these industries will tend to seek out lower factor
costs available in rural areas.
The difficulty in examining this rationale empirically is identifying a proxy that does not
lead merely to a tautological interpretation.  While average firm size for the industry in the
county presents itself as a likely candidate, the measure would do little more than confirm that
the presence of significantly larger plants increases the probability of being specialized.  It would
not provide information on whether or not large plant size is associated with the presence of sig-
nificant scale economies.
The problem requires a comparison of the observed average establishment size with a
disaggregate estimate of average establishment size if local establishments were operating com-
mensurate with the minimum efficient scale of production.  For the construction of this disaggre-
gate estimate, establishment size distribution down to the four-digit level provided in County
Business Patterns is coupled with Census of Manufacturing information on the average plant
size of the fifty largest companies (by sales) in each four-digit SIC.
i  Eckard (1994) provides a
rationale for associating this metric with minimum efficient scale of production—if internal
economies of scale do exist they are most likely to be exploited by the top firms.  In notation,
where USt50k = average establishment size of the fifty largest firms in the 4-digit
industry k included in the 2-digit industry i;
            SIC4k = the number of establishments in the county in the 4-digit industry k





























If the MES proxy (ratio of average firm size to top 50 firm size) is close to one, it is believed that
the establishments located in the area are operating near minimum efficient scale.  In the regres-
sion a positive sign will corroborate the internal economies of scale hypothesis.
Localization
Recent work on rural industrial development suggests an alternative explanation for in-
dustry specialization emphasizing the importance of external economies of scale (Henry and
Drabenstott 1996; Barkley and Henry 1997; Henry and Barkley 1997).  The empirical portion of
this work confirms that larger concentrations of industry employment in a region are associated
with faster rates of employment growth (Henry and Drabenstott, Henry and Barkley 1997).  This
result is used to suggest the reasonableness of competitive advantages flowing from the localiza-
tion of economic activity defined by industry concentration.  Three benefits of localization in a
Marshallian industrial district are 1) a pooled market for workers with specialized skills, 2) the
provision of nontraded inputs to an industry with greater variety and lower cost, and 3) informa-
tion flows that create technological spillovers.
However, there are alternative interpretations of these empirical results that may gain in-
sight from the present analysis.  Since there is no inclusion of variables that address the concen-
tration of industry employment across firms in these ‘clusters’ it is not possible to discern the ef-
fects attributable to external versus internal economies of scale.  A large industry presence could
be the result of one or a few larger firms or a collection of numerous smaller firms.  Alterna-
tively, the empirical analysis could be doing little more than identifying regions with sources of
comparative advantage that have little to do with localization economies.  By explicitly consid-
ering the concentration of industry employment across firms, this analysis can empirically assess
the veracity of claims regarding external economies of scale due to localization effects.5
Again we find that theoretical development of the concepts has outpaced empirical de-
velopment of valid proxies for the relations of interest.  Given the discussion above we propose
an axiomatic justification for the measure used to test the localization hypothesis.  The measure
should be increasing in the number of firms in a county—the assumption is that the probability
of technological spillovers, sourcing inputs locally or deriving labor pooling advantages will in-
crease as the number of establishments in an industry increase.  However, the raw number of
firms by itself is insufficient as it ignores the size dependency of some of these benefits.  For ex-
ample, establishments of similar size are more likely to be operating at similar levels of techno-
logical sophistication increasing the value of potential spillovers.  Similarly, employment op-
portunities will be the most substitutable across similar size establishments.  Thus, the measure
should also be increasing in the dispersal of employment across these firms and decreasing in the
concentration of employment in only a few.  A composite measure that satisfies these require-
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LOC will equal one in the case of a single establishment and increase in the number of estab-
lishments and the dispersion of employment across these plants.  The localization hypothesis will
be corroborated by a positive estimate.
Monopsony
The ‘company town’ construct is a powerful one in suggesting the strategic motivation
for locating large plants in small places of relative isolation.  The possibility also raises the most
unequivocal justification for industrial diversification.  Not only will diversification produce the
reputed benefits related to the stability of employment demand, greater competition in the local
labor market would also produce an unambiguous, positive welfare effect.  While evidence of the6
company town phenomenon is largely anecdotal—and this anecdotal evidence is of itself incon-
clusive (e.g., Boal 1995)—our epistemological motivation is one of confirmation requiring that
we consider all plausible alternatives (for theoretical motivation of the strategy see Lofgren
1996; Yeh, et al. 1996; Jones 1988).  Indeed, a positive result would generate the most definitive
policy implications.
To empirically test this explanation we again find the Herfindahl Concentration Index
productive—though this time in its canonical form.  We examine concentration in the manufac-
turing sector as a whole.  It is calculated as follows:
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If a county is truly a “company town” and only has one manufacturing firm then the Herfindahl
Index (MON) would have a value of one.  Thus, we would expect a positive sign on the coeffi-
cient of the monopsony power variable if this were a valid explanation of industry specialization.
The Data
The problem of nondisclosure of detailed data of industrial structures at the non-
metropolitan level is addressed here using a simple algorithm that uses disclosed employment
size ranges in County Business Patterns (CBP) to arrive at consistent employment estimates at
the 2-digit SIC level (Kreahling, Smith, and Frumento 1996).
ii
These employment estimates are then used in a disjoint cluster analysis to identify indus-
trial structures that may demonstrate single industry specialization.
iii Cluster analysis classifies
objects (counties) into groups based on the similarity of the object’s collection of attributes (em-
ployment share by industry).  Export base theory serves as the justification for limiting the analy-
sis to manufacturing, mining and exportable services-producing industries.  Indeed, the compu-
tation of locational Gini coefficients confirms that “locational clustering” is most pronounced for
manufacturing and selected service sectors (Barkley and Henry 1997 pp. 310-311).  Industry7
employment shares are defined as the proportion of total private employment rather than total
employment.  The policy goal of diversification seeks to lessen the variability in output caused
by a change in market demand, which argues against including a largely exogenous source of
government employment in the analysis.
The analysis includes all counties in Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia.  Reducing the sources of bias motivated the
inclusion of metropolitan counties in the clustering exercise.  There are increasing indications
that the conventional metro/nonmetro dichotomy may be of limited usefulness (Brown 1993).
Especially in the context of the Southeast—where many smaller metropolitan places maintain
strong specialization in manufacturing and where the rural/agricultural nexus is indistinct—the
exclusion of all metropolitan counties would be arbitrary.
The resulting cluster structure contains 15 county types, 13 of which can be described as
industry specializations.  Two of these specializations are non-manufacturing industries: one
Mining and one in Business Services.  The manufacturing specializations make up 11 of the
clusters corresponding to Food and Kindred Products, Textiles, Apparel, Lumber, Furniture, Pa-
per, Chemicals, Primary Metals, Fabricated Metals, Electrical Equipment and Transportation
Equipment.  The two nonspecialized categories were labeled Diversified Manufacturing—de-
scribing the relatively large share of employment in manufacturing but lacking a dominant in-
dustry—and Nonbasic—describing counties that did not have a large share of employment in
any of the export base industries included in the analysis.
The Model
The objective of the econometric exercise is to identify which of the rationales, if any, are
associated with the identification of a county as specialized. A logit model is used to model the
binary indicator of a county being specialized or not being specialized in a particular industry.
 iv8
The logit model estimates the probability of an event based on explanatory factors in such a way
that the probability remains in the interval [0,1].  Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) is used
and provides consistent estimates of the parameter coefficients.
The probability of a county being specialized in an industry, as a function of the alterna-
tive rationales discussed earlier, is modeled as:
Pi = 1/(1 + e
-X`b)
where  X`b = b0 + b1MESi + b2LOCi + b3MONi + b4POPi
Pi = the probability of county i being specialized in the industry being tested
MESi = minimum efficient scale of production in county i for the tested industry
LOCi = localization economies in county i for this industry
MONi = monopsonistic power in county i
POPi = population of county i
The model is estimated for each of the eleven manufacturing specializations identified by the
cluster analysis.  The hypothesis tests of interest are whether or not the individual parameters as-
sociated with the various proxies of the rationales for rural specialization are powerful in ex-
plaining the probability that a county is specialized in an industry.  The critical significance level
is set at 0.05 for a two-tailed test.
The explanatory variables in the model are proxies for minimum efficient scale of pro-
duction (MES), localization economies (LOC), and monopsony power (MON). County popula-
tion (POP) is included to examine the maintained hypothesis that specialization is explained by
the combination of one of the 3 rationales with small settlement size.  In review, MES is proxied
by actual average establishment size for the county divided by the constructed value for the aver-
age size of a top fifty company for that county.  LOC is proxied by the number of establishments
in an industry divided by the Herfindahl concentration index for the industry.  Finally, MON is
proxied by the Herfindahl concentration index for all manufacturing in the county.  A positive
estimate will corroborate any one of the alternative hypotheses thought to explain single industry
specialization.9
Results
In general the results of the econometric exercise (summarized in Table 1) are promising.
For each industry the system statistics (log-likelihood test, concordant probabilities and the
pseudo R
2) suggest that the model as a whole is powerful in identifying various characteristics
associated with specialization.  While at least one of the variables is significant in each equation
it is notable that the collection of significant variables differ by regression.  The implications are
that industries differ in important respects devaluing aggregate analysis of ‘the manufacturing
sector’ and that industry specificity will be important in framing policy responses to the prob-
lems or opportunities presented by specialization.
However, the statistical success of the exercise should make us more sensitive to the eco-
nomic information actually conveyed by the analysis. The minimum efficient scale (MES) vari-
able is found to be significant for each industry but Paper.  The prudent question regarding this
result is to ask whether the MES variable is capturing information that is distinct from the aver-
age observed establishment size variable used in construction of the proxy.  A strong correlation
between MES and observed firm size (•  > 0.80) seriously devalues the economic interpretation
of the MES estimate for the Apparel, Lumber, Furniture, Electrical Equipment, and Fabricated
Metals industries.  For these industries, the result becomes tautological: counties with larger
plants will demonstrate a higher probability of being specialized.  In these cases, relative estab-
lishment size is largely indistinguishable from the relative size of the MES proxy.
In the remaining five regressions there are two distinct phenomena observed.  For the
Chemicals, Transportation Equipment, and Primary Metals industries there are noticeable differ-
ences between the expected average establishment size in general and specialized counties
v.
This suggests that specialization may be partially explained by differences in the 4-digit industry
mix for these three cases (e.g., an automobile body plant is on average an order of magnitude10
bigger than various automobile parts plants).  In this case it is difficult to untangle the MES ef-
fects from the industry mix effects.  However, Textiles and Food provide strong evidence of the
exploitation of scale economies consistent with the conceptual foundations of the proxy.  With
these industries the expected average establishment size is nearly identical for general and spe-
cialized counties.  Therefore, with the Food and Textiles industries larger observed average plant
size in specialized counties is arguably the result of core firms exploiting internal economies of
scale.
The Localization proxy (LOC) is positive and significant for the Food, Textiles, Apparel,
Lumber, Furniture, Primary Metals, and Fabricated Metals industries.  Again, a closer examina-
tion of the distribution of the localization variable is informative.  As shown in Table 2 the mean
values for specialized counties in Food, Apparel, Primary Metals, and Fabricated Metals are
relatively small and roughly equivalent to the localization value for all counties.  This suggests
that the strength of the association may result from correctly identifying non-specialized coun-
ties; i.e., single establishment counties.  The localization variable is considerably larger for Lum-
ber.  But here again there is little difference in the mean level between specialized and non-
specialized counties suggesting that the localization variable may be more determinative of those
counties with an exceptionally low probability of being specialized.  The relatively high values
for the localization value can be in part explained by the co-location of logging camps and saw-
mills.
A positive case of external economies being strongly associated with industry specializa-
tion is most evident for the Textiles and Furniture industries.  Comparing the distribution of this
variable between specialized and non-specialized counties (Table 2) in combination with the re-
gression results provide convincing evidence that the exploitation of external economies of scale
is a rationale for specialization in the Furniture and Textiles industries.  The fact that both these11
industries have often been the focus of studies examining localization economies (Kristensen
1991, Piore and Sabel 1984, Sforzi 1991) reinforces the conclusion that this process may be op-
erating in rural specializations.
The monopsony power proxy (MON) is significant in the Textiles, Paper, and Electrical
Machinery regressions (Table 1).  However, the Textiles estimate is the wrong sign reinforcing
the conclusion that the creation of localization economies is the rationale for specialization in
this industry.  With both Paper and Electrical Machinery the odds ratio for monopsony power is
extremely high (see Table 1).  This suggests empirically that those counties with the highest con-
centration indexes are consistently specialized.  Examining the Beale codes for the specialized
counties in these industries reveals that ten of the twelve specialized counties in Paper and that
twelve out of fifteen specialized counties in Electrical Machinery are rural with most of them
having populations less than 20,000.  Plus, six of the counties for each are non-adjacent to met-
ropolitan areas.  The fact that many of these counties are most likely to contain, small, less mo-
bile labor forces reinforces the suggestion that the pursuit of monopsony power is a consistent
explanation of specialization in the Paper and Electrical Machinery industries.
vi
Conclusion
The monopsony explanation for specialization presents itself as the strongest case where
industrial diversification has clear advantages as a policy goal.  Not only will these communities
reduce their vulnerability to shocks in the dominant industry, increased competition in the local
labor market will also have direct benefits for the workforce.  While possible in any industry, the
analysis suggests that this phenomenon is more prevalent in counties specialized in Paper and
Electrical Machinery.  However, the feasibility of industrial diversification as a policy goal is
perhaps uncomfortably tied to the political structure of the local economy.
The intermediate case for diversification is found in those counties specialized in indus-12
tries likely to derive benefits from internal economies of scale.  Diversification of itself will not
work at cross purposes to the rationale of industry specialization identified in Food, Chemicals,
Primary Metals and Transportation Equipment.  Rather, any technical economies in production
may impose substantial “portfolio constraints” on how employment is distributed across indus-
tries.  Public policies that reduce the volatility of local employment demand (e.g., sheltering
profits that are used for skill upgrading during downturns) may be a more feasible approach than
attracting new industries.  Real conflicts may emerge, however, in considering the advisability of
substantial expansion of an existing plant relative to the attraction of diversified employment.  
Finally, the localization rationale for specialization presents a counter to the benefits of
greater diversification.  If a critical mass of independent firms is a prerequisite for the competi-
tiveness of local industry then the goal of diversification would merely dilute the possibility of
external economies.  The appropriate policy response is made more difficult by the substantial
import penetration in those industries identified as most likely to generate external economies—
i.e., Textiles and Furniture.  Yet, the folly of trying to pick the most appropriate industrial struc-
ture argues against either the purposive concentration or divestment of these industries.  Rather,
policy in this instance (and in all other contexts where localization benefits are evident despite
being found in other industries) should concentrate on enhancing and augmenting the already
extant localization benefits.  Training consortia, specialized machine or business service bureaus,
facilitating co-production relations—among other ‘real services’—are clear and proven means of
increasing the competitiveness of local economies that have already begun to discover the ad-
vantages of localization (Brusco 1992).13
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  Coefficient -1.16 .30 -.29 -2.03* -2.24 -5.05*
  P-Value .27 .587 .58 .0185 .0718 .0129
MES




  P-Value .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0865
  Odds Ratio 1.235 2.779 2.96 86.96 7.342 1.8
Localization
  Coefficient .056* .033* .076* .015* .072* .21
  P-value .0042 .0001 .0001 .002 .0002 .17
  Odds Ratio 1.058 1.03 1.08 1.02 1.075 1.235
Monopsony
  Coefficient -3.74 -3.6* -.47 .054 -1.67 10.69*
  P-Value .14 .015 .593 .97 .57 .0076
  Odds Ratio 0.024 .027 .624 1.06 .189 999.0
Population
  Coefficient -.00004* -.00003* -.0001* -.0001* -.0001* -.0001*
  P-Value .0054 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0006 .0467
  Odds Ratio 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Concordant 87.3% 87.7% 86.7% 87.3% 95.3% 96.7%
-2 log l 39.232* 106.58* 185.74* 76.46* 68.76* 50.1*
Pseudo R




4.7 30.22 23.34 5.55 3.8 3.02
* indicates significance at the .05 confidence level
W indicates correlation between MES proxy and observed  average firm size is greater than .8014
Table 1 (cont’d)





















  Coefficient -4.2* -2.98* -3.86* -5.88* -2.49*
  P-Value .0001 .007 .001 .0001 .037
MES
  Coefficient .73* 1.05* 1.63*
t .92*
t 1.95*
  P-Value .0001 .0001 .0001 .0001 .0004
  Odds Ratio 2.09 2.87 5.13 2.51 7.054
Localization
  Coefficient .025 .09* .08* .037 .07
  P-value .217 .046 .016 .138 .103
  Odds Ratio 1.026 1.095 1.078 1.038 1.072
Monopsony
  Coefficient 3.18 .29 2.08 7.6* -.43
  P-Value .16 .92 .365 .002 .865
  Odds Ratio 24.025 1.34 8.026 999.0 .645
Population
  Coefficient -.00002 -.00002 -.0001* -.00002 -.00004*
  P-Value .116 .105 .018 .23 .027
  Odds Ratio 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Concordant 91.6% 82.6% 90.3% 91.1% 90.1%
-2 log l 46.657* 26.087* 45.6* 40.66* 31.47*
Pseudo R
2 .113 .09 .08 .11 .076
% of Counties
Specialized
4.92 6.46 2.86 4.75 4.47
* indicates significance at the .05 confidence level
W indicates correlation between MES proxy and observed  average firm size is greater than .8015
Table 2
Mean Localization Values






Primary Metals 4.32 6.42
Fabricated Metals 19.11 8.0416
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